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Introduction
At the outset I should stress that the statements made about
the Danish economy and society are largely impressionistic, being based
on discussions and subjective observation during five days in Denmark,
supplemented by some background reading and study of statistics. }~at,
the major purpose of my visit, and of this report, was not to study
DenrraCrk as such but rather to view Irish problems, and the research we
are doing on them, in the light of Danish experience. Moreover, I did
¯ not go there with an open mind: I had, so to speak~ many hypotheses
relating to Ireland already in mind and I wanted to see how these looked
when viewed against a Danish background.
My visit was at the kind i2,vitation of Dr Henning Friis,
Director of the Danish National Institute of Social Research, who might
also be described as the father of the social side of our Institute. I had
discussions with several members of his staff, and, in addition, through
his agency and that of his Institute’s Administrator, Mr S~ren Rishf~j
Pedersen, I talked with persons in the public service, academic life,
1industry and so on. I would like to ach]owledge the great courtesy and
kindness extended to me.
Economic Situation
The basic similarities in the scale of Denmark and Ireland
~,ive special point to any comparison between the two countries. The
geographical area of Denmark is less than two-tl~irds that of the Repubiic,
but with a population of 5 million as against our 3 million, the density of
2
population there is nearly three times as great. The similarities extend
beyond mere size. The Danish economy is very open, though not quite as
open as in Ireland, and in the past they have had a strong agricultural
tradition. Denmark, no less than Ireland, escaped serious economic
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1. A list is attached in the Appendix.
2. It is worth ,~oting that in 1921, the population of the twenty-six counties
of Ireland was almost identical with that of Denmarl% and in 1870 was nearly
i~vice as great. Moreover, had we now the same density as in Denmarl%
our population would be 8¼ million.
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disruption during the war, even though occupied by Germany. After the
war they had, like us, Slow growth up to 1957 with high unemployment.
Like us also, they had a substantial transformation thereafter.
A major difference, however, which is evident to the eye
as well as in the statistics, is the far higher standard of living in Denmark.
The statistics suggest that, at current exchange rateS, the average level
of GDP per head is 2½ times that of Ireland. However, it is doubtful if
their standard of living is as much as 2½ times greater, since the price
level appears to be significantly higher than in Ireland. 1 Nevertheless,
it remains true that real income per person is, on the average, considerably
higher than in Ireland. Moreover, such poverty as there is exists only
in marginal pockets and is not at all obvious. Denmark has also had a
sufficiently rapid growth in total employment since the late 1950s to over-
come its serious unemployment problem in the decade after the war.
Thus, full employment was maintained in the 1960s without emigration,
even though the labour force was rising by over I per cent per annum and
2the outflow from agriculture was considerable.
Causes of the DaD ish Economic Miracle
How did the Danes reach such a high level of income per
~, full employment and virtual eiiminatio!1 of poverty? Faced with
i. I became acutely conscious of price differences at an early stage.
The travel agent had reserved an hotel room costing about £8 a night for
bed and breakfast and I assumed that this would be a reasonably good
quality hotel. However, as I subsequently confirmed from the Copenhagen
hotel list, it was, in fact, ahnost the cheapest hotel in the city. Never-
theless, it was quite respectable if dilapidated, being inhabited, in so far
as it wa____~s inhabited, by impecunious foreign students and rustic Danes from
Jutland. The only other 2~aest lending distinction to the place was an Arab,
a representative of the Egyptian newspaper "AI-Ahram", who spoke English
with a perfect Etonian accent told whom I overheard selling advertising
space to rather nervous Danish businessmen.
2. It is true that Danish unemployment has risen again in the current
recession and the official rate is about 12 per cent, which, on the face of
it, seems higher thml in Ireland. In fact, this is a false picture and illus-
trates the care needed in making international comparisons. The
denominator on which the Danes base their unemployment rate consists of
what they call "insured,workers", numbering only 800, 000 out of a total
labour force of 2½ million. The remainder are engaged mainly in activities,
like the public service, where there is no unemployment as ordinarily under-
stood. In fact, the position is that the absolute number unemployed is not
substantially different from the present Irish figure of I00, 000; and, given
that the Danish labour force is considerably more than twice that in Ireland,
it would be more correct to say that the current, short-term problem there
is less than half that in Ireland.
the question, it is far easier to say how they did no___tt do it than how they
did it:
Ca) It was not through agriculture, at least not since the last
war. The growth rate of agricu,ltural output has been
relatively slow, agricultural numbers have been declining,
and agriculture now represents only I0 per cent of the total
labour force and 8 per cent of total GDP.
Not through medium-term economic planning, since they
have never had such, though they do have long-term perspec-
tive plans for selected aspects of the economy.
(c) Not through export subsidies or capital grants to industry,
since they have never employed these incentives.
(d) Not through price competitiveness, for they have had from
1958 up to recently one of the highest inflation rates among
OE CD countries
(e) Not through a sound balance of payments position, for they
have been under conthaual threat in that regard.
(f) Not through maintenance of large external reserves, since
these have usually amounted to no more than one month’s
imports.
(g) Not through capital-intensive industrial development, for
they have concentrated to a considerable eA~ent on labour-
intensive and sldll-intensive activities.
Not through expansion of public debt, since they have, in
fact, been reducing the public debt while it was expanding
rapidly in Ireland.
(i) Not through a slow growth in public exDenditure, since they
have had one of the fastest in Europe.
Not through low rates of income taxation, since they have
had extremely high rates.
(k) Not by postponing social services until they had achieved
economic development, for they have long been to the fore-
front in that regard.
(1) Not by deferring expenditure on housing (as was argued in
Ireland on the grom~ds that such investment was not produc-
tive) for Demnark is one of the few developed countries
without a serious housing problern.
(m)
°,
Not by foreign enterprise, since they have relied almost
exclusively on native enterprise.
Not by state-sponsored bodies, for they have far fewer of
these than in Ireland.
You will recognise that this list, which I could readily extend,
is not an arbitrary one but consists of strategies that, at one time or another,
have been advocated or adopted in Ireland. But, while it is easy to say how
they did not do it, even the Danes themselves find it difficult to explain how
they, in fact, did it.
Professor Anders ~lgaard suggested to me that it was the
outcome of some major accidents. First was the fact that in the general
world depression of the 1930s protection was forced on them to defend
employment. Though not consciously introduced for the development of
infant industries, protection, in fact, worked in that way. A second major
factor - again largely extraneous - was the move to free trade in the post-
war period, starting with the pressure for liberation of multilateral trade
in the OEEC, and progressing through GATT, ElrTA m~d the EEC. As
you are aware, the chief problem with the infant industry argument is
that, in practice, the hifants generally do not wisl~ to grow up, but prefer
to shelter in the protection of sustained trade restrictions. However, the
general international pressure for free trade provided the Danish govern-
ment with a strong lever in reducing protection. A further extzaneous
factor mentioned by ~Igaard was the sigzlifieant improven~ent in the terms
of trade for Denmark fn the late 1950s. This picture, While containii~g a
1good deal of truth, seems to me an incomplete and unsatisfactory explanation.
Ireland also had substantial protection during the 1930s, Ireland also parti-
cipated in the move to free trade since World War II, m~d Ireland also had
the benefit of substantially improved terms of trade from about the end of
the 1950s. Yet, our economic achievement is far less impressive. There
are, in fact, other major factors which, though they may be taken for granted
by the Dmles, strike the Irish visitor forcefully.
Early Start
It should first be pointed out that in 1930, even before the
advent of protection, Denmark was far more highly industrialised than
Ireland. At that time, 59 per cent of their population was urbanised as
against only 32 per cent in Ireland, while the proportion of their labour
force engaged in industry was 27 per cent as against only 14 per cent here.
1. "The picture was not a casual view thrown out by ~lgaard to fob off an
uninformed, but persistent, foreign inquirer. In fact, he elaborates these
arguments in his forthcoming EEC study of the Danish economy, the counter-
part of the study of Ireland by Richard Bruton and myself.
Hence, in order to throw light on the Danish miracle, I think it would be
necessary to go much further back than the protection of the 1930s, and to
recognise that Denmark had a much earlier sf2.rt in the process of economic
development.
In particular, it is necessary to emphasise the importance
initially of an enterprising agricultural sector, efficient in production,
tec|mologically progressive, quality conscious and with a powerful tradition
of cooperation. Without this base, and the spirit underlying and engendered
by it, the industrial response to the factors mentioned by ~)Igaard might not
have been so satisfactory. The story of the earlier phase of Danish
economic development has been well documented by Dr Beddy in his 1943
1SSISI paper and I shall not pursue the Ins.tier further here. But, in
speaJdng of other sectors of the economy, you will find me returning to the
virtues that characterised Dmlish agriculture at an early stage.
Enterprise
The first of these virtues is individual enterprise and
initiative. Anyone coming from Ireland cannot fail to be impressed by the
fact that the vast industrial transformation in Denmark has been achieved
almost entirely by native, and not by foreign1, enterprise. Even more
impressive from an Irish viewpoint is that it was a matter of private,
rather than state, initiative: apart from protection in the 1930s there has
been little or nothing in the way of direct government incentives.
It is difficult to account for the much weaker domestic
industrial response in Ireland without regard to the enterprise factor.
Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether we were wise, despite our
late start, to switch so soon to reliance on forei~ enterprise? Brendan
Dowling and I have arguedz that there were signs that native industry was
beginning in the 1950s to develop export markets; and we took the view
that, had there been a more favourable domestic demand environment at
that time, the development of native industry would have been much more
impressive then. Had Ireland also persisted longer before dismantling
I. J.P. Beddy: "A Comparison of the Principal Economic Features of
Eire and Denmark", Journal of the Statistical and Social Inguiry Society
of Ireland, VoI.XVII, 1943/44.
2. Kieran A. Kem~edy and Brendan R. Dowling: Economic Growth in
Ireland: The Experience Since 1947 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan; New
York: Barnes and Noble, 1975).
i
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protection, would we have achieved a satisfactory rate of development
without such massive recourse to foreign enterprise7 I will not here seek
to answer that question myself, but I may say th~.t the Danes i met had little
sympathy with the idea that we could not develop ourselves. Whenever I
remarked about any of their policies that it wouldn’t work in Ireland, the
invariable reply was: "People in Denmark said exactly the same before
we tried it, but we went ahead and found that it worked". I think this
remark exemplifies a crucial difference between the two countries: the
Danes may have as many sceptics as we have but, unlike us, they go ahead
told do something whereas we conthme talldng about the difficulties of doing
it.
Who were thesQ entrepreneurs in Denmark, and in what
fields were they engaged? Mr Niels Groes, an econom_ist at the University
of Copenhagen, gave me an outline of his findings in a study of this matter
(unfortunately, the study is published e1~y in Danish). First, the entre-
preneurs were, in the main, small scale and widely diversified sectorally
1
and regionally. Second, the entrepreneurs were, in general, relatively
uneducated in the academic sense: such education as they had tended to be
in the sIdlled trades. Third, they were generally worIdng on the factory
floor of an existing firm when they got an idea for a new p~o~]act or process.
hmovation was the keynote of the new enterprises, and the innovations were
native rather than borrowed on licence from abroad. Fourth~ the entre-
preneurs generally had very little capital at the start and there was no
public body, such as the Industrial Credit Company, to come to their aid.
Their main source of capital initially was often suppliers’ credit, coupled
with extremely hard work by the entrepreneur and his family while main-
taining little more thmn a subsistence level of drawings from the business.
Thus, retained earnings were largely ploughed back. A further important
form of credit was the mortgage of personal property. Fifth, the entre-
preneurs were essentially expert in production (and all that goes with it,
such as designl, quality, technology, etc). They blew little about other
aspects of business so frequently stressed in Ireland (such as finance,
marketing, personnel, ete). It is as though the Danish view was: make
the article good enough and it will sell itself.
io It fs a general characteristic of Danish society that while there are,
of course, regional, occupational, and other disparities, by and large they
are not nearly so marked as in Ireland.
Capital-Intensive Versus Labour-Intensive Industry
As you might deduce from the entrepreneurial environment
I have described, Danish entrepreneurs have effectively been forced into
labour-intensive and sldll-intensive activities; and their success shows
that this approach is viable in some circumstances at least. You may be
aware that I have expressed reservations    about the suitability of the
Irish industrial incentives which tend to favour capital-intensive industry,
contrary to all economic logic, given that the country is scarce in capital
relative to the present and prospective labour force. All of the economists
I met felt that Ireland was ill-advised to persist in such a strategy, given
the scale of our employment problem over the next decade, and the very
considerable cost to the Exchequer. 1 They felt that if we must provide
cash incentives to new industry, we should at least devise an alternative
and feasible strategy in the form of labour subsidies.
However, the only example they could usefully cite in this
regard was in Germany, where such an approach has been used in some
regions in the context of short-term stabilisation policy. Essentially, it
involves paying an employer the equivalent of an individual’s unemployment
benefit for each unemployed worker hired. Thus, the employer himself
has to pay only the difference between the going wage rate and the amount
2
of unemployment benefit, and this is obviously a major labour subsidy.
However, I was unable to get a clear pict~ire of the effects of the scheme
in practice.
It seems to me that it might be ea:sier to administer such a
scheme in a longer-term development context, directing the labour subsidy,
not at unemployment, but at new jobs. It should not prove too difficult to
devise an administratively feasible definition of a new job, though, of
course, the problem of definition would be greater in existing, than in new,
firms. It is possible that trade unions might use such a scheme as a lever
to raise wages in the new enterpris% and then seek to have these extended
1. Professor ~51gaard told me about a case concerning the Farces Island,
to which he is economic advisor. This is an island of about 40, 000 people
which has increased its prosperity through fishing mid is now anxious to
launch some conspicuous industrial development. It had entered into
negotiations with a multinational company to produce cables, a proposal
strongly but unsuccessfully opposed by ~lgaard on the grounds that it was
far too capital-intensive. In the event, and much to Olgaard’s relief, the
multinational decided not to locate its plant there because it had received
a better offer from Ireland.
2. Clearly, such a scheme would require safeguards against the obvious
abuse, namely, that an employer might render his existing workers unem-
ployed and then re-hire them to get the benefit of the subsidy.
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to other enterprises through the comparability principle. I do not deny
the difficulties but, nevertheless, it is an idea that might be examined further.
Company Taxation
The fact that entrepreneurs relied to a considerable extent
on retained earnings naturally raises the question of the system of tamation
of firms. Essentially, the tax position in Denmark favours the company
form of operation and the retention of earnings: profits on unincorporated
businesses and dividends are taxed at the very high income tax rates’,
whereas retained earnings of companies are taxed a.t the much lower rate
of 37½ per cent. Thus, most businesses quicldy become companies and
the differential taxation in favour of retained earnings encourage s the
ploughing back of profits.
Technolog~ical irmovation mid Design
I have laid particular stress on design mid technological
ira]ovation in Danish industrial development. What factors fostered this
enterprise in design and ilmovation7 A cardinal influence is the prestige
attached in Dm]ish education to the industrial arts. For example, Dem_~_ark
has always had many professorships of fl]dustrial design, several of whom
pioneered modern designs and developed students who later exploited such
designs at the factory floor.
It is generally accepted that Danish modern design in such
materials as silver, porcelain, glass, furniture, ceramics, pewter and
so on, is superb. I emphasise particularly m.odern design; it is true that
they have their traditional prestige designs in porcelain and glass, just as
we" have Beleek and Waterford Glass. L~t, by its ve~-y nature, the tradi-
tional high quality -~rticle will rarely, in itself, provide a sufficiently broad
base for a major industrial drive. The Danes, while retaining the profitable
traditional designs, have pioneered new designs on a wide scale.
Perhaps I might insert a word here about industrial desig~
1in Ireland, since any review of our industrial incentives might well con-
sider a switch from capital subsidies, not to labour subsidies but rather,
1. The information on which this paragraph is based was kindly supplied
by Jeremiah Moynihan who is engaged on a study of Coras Trgcht~la Teo
for his M.A. thesis at UCD.
oto expenditure on improvement of design. In 1961, Coras Tr~cht~tla Teo
commissioned a study on the subject by a team of six Scandinavians, which
included three prominent Danish designers. In their report, Design in
¯ Ireland, they noted that "Irish culture has developed a distinct learning
towards literature, theatre, the spoken word and abstract thinking, rather
than creation by hand or machine and the visual arts - the other side of
human activity in civilisation".. Among the many interesting statements
told recommendations in the report, it is interesting to note their view on
the role of home demand: ’rWe believe that one of the great factors in the
success of Scandinavian design abroad is that the production is based on
what has already been established and on local demand rather than on
export requirements. The Scandinavians designed and manufactured work
for Scandinavians and the ultimate export success depended on this outlook".
Since then, some progress has been made and design consciousness has
increased considerably. In particular, the ~L~enny Design Workshops
havemade a notable contribution. However, while I would be the last to
judge the success of a programme by the size of its expenditure, one might
question the scale on which the problem is being taclded officially. In
1973/74, the total Government grant to the I¢ilkelmy Design Workshops was
£¼ million: this compares with total st~te expeflditure on industry (not
counting transport, fuel and power) of over £70 million in that year.
Moreover, it was only in 1969 that CTT eventually began offering desigm
fellowships to young Irish persons for study abroad: the number involved,
four, seems miserably small, even allowing for the fact that every begin-
ning must be a little one. And perhaps progress has been least of all in
education on which the Scandinavian team laid such emphasis: ’%Ve think
that it is impossible for Ireland to make progress in design without a
radical change in the existing education institutions sa~d a new approach to
the problems involved".
I encountered strong scepticism generally about the role of
academic secondary or university education in encouraging economic
development
, 
on the grounds that such an education often inhibits rather
than fosters creativity in regard to the production side of industry. They
felt that a pronounced tendency towards academic education, such as exists
in Ireland, would make it impossible to provide sufficient jobs, unless
complementary importance were attached to technical education. Some
even added that, since academic education rendered its recipients literate
and vocal in demanding their "rights", there could be serious social unrest
in the event of their remaining unemployed.
Though high quality consumer design has played a major
role in the Danish industrial initiative, of evengreater importance "for
exports has been technological innovation in producers goods in a wide
range of industries, but especially in light industry. Here again, parti-
cular stress was laid on the role of education and research in relation to
technological innovation, but with an interesting twist. The Danes have
poured vast sums of money into such academies: yet, the academies
themselves, so I was told, produced few workable ilmovations, and, in
that sense, the investment was a total waste. However, these academies
were also teaching institutions and many of their students, after a few
years experience in industry, produced effective innovations. The
importance of the practical learning environment of the factory floor was
repeatedly stressed to me. The thought arises as to whether, in the light
of the Danish experience, Ireland should consider more direct involvement
of its R & D institutions in the ’~echnological colleges, and develop even
closer links with the factory floor.
,Competitivene s s
," As an economist schooled in the importance of price com-
petitiveness, perhaps the most puzzling feature to me was how the Danes
managed to sell abroad. As I mentioned, the general price level seemed
substantially higher than in Ireland as the prevailing exchange rate.
Moreover, in most countries one visits, even if the general cost of living
is higher, one still finds many items that are absolutely cheaper, due
either to the law of comparative advantage of differences in indirect tax
rates. But, in my own observation I did not see anything that was actually
cheaper than in Ireland.
It is true that the Danes have had persistent balance of pay-
ments troubles. However, while I would not wish to discount this unduly,
the fact remains that Denmark has achieved an impressive rate of growth
of industrial exports: these are now of far greater consequence than agri-
cultural exports even allowing for the agricultural content of industrial
exports. The economists I met expressed considerable perplexity about
Danish competitiveness: they themselves marvelled at its continuance;
and were frank enough to admit that they did not know all the answers.
However, I feel that I was given some insight into the resolution of the
problem. Mr J~agen Hansen, an economist at the equivalent of our
Confederation of Irish Industry, who has made a special study of the issue,
put it best perhaps when he said that the Drams had concentrated on goods
where price competitiveness as such was not a major determining factor.
This approach was forced on individual entrepreneurs by the high level of
wages. In principle, a high level of wages can be offset by a high level
of productivity, but the Danes concluded that in many mass-produced items
they could not achieve a sufficiently high rate of productivity to offset the
1
high level of wages. In arriving at this conclusion, the entrepreneurs
were, no doubt, influenced by the fact that capital - one means of achieving
s high level of labour productivity - was not so freely available or clmap.
Hence, in consumer goods Danish competitiveness depended chiefly on out-
standing design at the upper end of the quality market; and, in producer
¯ goods, on teclmo!ogical innovation.
If this picture is correct, it provides an important warning
to us in our research. Though we pay lip-service to determinants of
exports other than price and demand, we generally i2zlore them at the
¯ analytical stage, particularly in the econometric approach. 2
Demand Expansion
It would, however, be totally wrong toregard the Danish
economic achievement, particularly in the growth of employment, as based
purely on industrial development, or to conclude that industrial develcp-
me~t has been solely e~rt-.led. In fact, Denmark maintained an extremely
rapid rate of growth of domestic demand, largely by fiscal expansion, since
the late 1950s. The rise in public expenditure has been phenomenah from
25 per cent of GDP in 1960 to 42 per cent in 1972, an increase which far
1. Hence, they are quite resigned, for example, to the fact that their
already greatly dimfl]ished textile in&retry will virtually disappear in EEC
conditions. As Professor Dlgaard put it: "We would prefer to leave that
type of activity to the Koreans".
2. Another example may serve to illustrate the point further. I visited a
fishing-tactde shop to see what the artificial flies were like. From previous
experience in other Europem~ countries, I was not surprised Lo find that the
varieties and names were mainly British. I was a little more surprised to
find that they were all imported: the assistant told me that though many
Danish fishermen made flies for their private use it would be totally un-
economic at Danish wage rates to produce flies commercially. Up to
recently, most of the flies were imported from Britain, but of late they
were being replaced by imports from Gambia which produced similar flies
more cheaply. On learning that I was from Ireland, the assistant remarked
that at one time they sold Rogan’ s flies, made in a family business in
Donegal. He told me that the flies were of the best quality, reasonably
priced and, therefore, highly profitable to him. When I enquired why he
no longer stocked them, he hesitated before replying that supplies were
erratic.
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exceeds the Irish rate (from 27 to 38 per cent of GDP) in a period regBrded
1
here as exceptionally expansionary. It should be borne in mind that the
much more rapid Danish expansion took place in the context of a far tighter
constraint in external reserves.
Some of the Danish economists deplored this rapid expansion
on grounds that it had led to a relatively high rate of pride increase - as,
indeed, it did, long before the recent acceleration of inflation. But, I
would accept the view of Friis ,and the younger Danish economists that the
rate of inflation experienced by Denmark in the 1960s (about 6 per cent per
¯ annum) was a small price to pay for full employment, the achievement and
maintenance of which depended crucially on the rapid rate of expansion in
domestic demand° Evidence is accumulating all the time - both for
developed and underdeveloped countries - that the manufa.cturing sector,
vital though it may be as a basis .for development, carmot gene rate anything
\
like enough jobs for full employment. Eamon Henry drew attention to this
2issue in Ireland, and his analysis is substantially confirmed by Danish
experience, where the most rapid rates of employment growth have been
3in building and construction, and the public sector.
i. Capital transfers are excluded in both the Danish and the Irish figures
here. Their inclusion would raise the Irish, relative to the Danish, level
in both ycars, but would only have a slight effect on the relative rate of
increase.
2. Earn.on Henry: Irish Full-Employment Structures, 1968 and %975
(Dub!in: The Economic and Social Research Institute, Paper No.74, 1974).
3.. Following are the comparative employment growth rates by sector:
Denmark Ireland
(1960-72) (1961-72)
% per annum
¯ Agriculture -3.3
Manufacturing (including electricity) 0.6
Building aad Construction 2.7
Se rvice s 2.8
Total 1.3
-3.1
1.7
2.5
1.0
-0.1
It may be noted that the Danish growth rate exceeded the Irish much more
in the case of total employment than total GDP (4.7 per cent in Denmark
as against 3.9 per cent in Ireland), the corollary being a lower rate of
productivity growth in Denmark (3.4 per cent as against 4.0 per cent).
The growth rate of employment in building and construction in Ireland from
1961 to 1972 must be seen in the context of the decline of 3.6 per cent per
a~mum in the preceding decade. Thus, the 1972 level of employment in
that industry in Ireland was 10 per cent less than in 1951, whereas in
Denmark it was 50 per cent greater.
The Balanced Budget Multiplier
The expansion in public expenditure was mainly due to sub-
stantial increases in public employment in all kinds of service activities
(e.g. civil service, universities, research, health, day-care, and so on)
as well as in social security transfers. In other words, it was mainly in
public Current expenditure rather than in public capital expenditure, and
the public capital programme is nowhere nearly as important as in Ireland.
For example, the housing situation in Denmark is remarkable not only for
its adequacy but also because so little of it has been publicly provided.
Mos~ of the housing activity by public authorities in ireland is undertaken
there by cooperative building societies. The State has assisted to the
extent of subsidising the interest rate at which these societies borrow so
as to maintain the rate no higher than 6 per cent. Nevertheless, the
government has been relieved of the need for directly raising large capital
sums; and it is probable that the societies operate with greater flexibility
and more regard to individual circumstance than is possible for a public
authority.
"There is a cardinal difference between the two countries in
the way in which the rise in aggregate public e~:penditure was financed.
In Ireland a significant proportion was financed by borrowing, with the
result that the borrowing requirement has grown at an enormous, and
perhaps unsustainable, rate; while the level of public debt relative to GNP
is now second only to Britain among EE C countries, hi Denmark, on the
other hand, tax revenue rose by more than public expenditure and exceeded
total expenditure (current and capital) throughout. Thus, the government
was able to reduce the level of national debt, which is now virtually zero.
Those of you who al;e not economists may wonder how such a policy could
be so expansionary, as it undoubtedly was. The answer lies in an economic
theory known as the balanced budget multiplier, which indicates that equal
increases in government expenditure (on goods and services) and in revenue
will be ex-pansionary rather than neutral in their effect on demand. One
important reason for this is that increased taxes are met partly out of
saving and not solely by reducing personal consumer expenditure.
I confess that while I was entirely familiar with the notion
of the balanced budget multiplier as a theoretical construct, I never
attached much importance to it as a practical matter, so that the Danish
experience was a revelation to me. It is true that the balanced budget
multiplier in Ireland may not be quite so significant for domestic demand
because of our higher import propensity. It is also true that the balanced
budget multiplier is largely irrelevant when, as in the last few years, in-
creases in government expenditure and in revenue mainly reflect price
increases rather than real increases. Nevertheless, it is likely that
during the 1960s the balanced budget multiplier was also important in the
Irish context, quite apart from the expansionary impetus of increased
public borrowing.
One of the corollaries of the Danish government’s success
in reducing the national debt was that the municipalities, housing societies
and other such institutions were forced to borrow substantially. Industry
also had to find its own capital. Indeed, many institutions and firms
borrowed considerably abroad and this played a role in maintaining external
reserves in the face of current balance of payments problems. Some of
the Danish economists regarded it as somewhat ~aradoxical that the govern-
ment, while reducing its own indebtedness, tacitly encouraged other agencies
to increase indebtedness, including foreigr~ indebtedness. However, I see
nothing particularly wrong with this: it represents a delegation of authority
and responsibility and a brake on centralisation which could make for
greater efficiency.
Disincentive Effects of Social Welfare Benefits
A substantial part of the growth of public empenditure has
been devoted to creating a welfare state far in advance of most countries
of the world. An issue of considerable interest to me was whether this
had led to substantial disincentive effects. I was thintdng, particularly,
of our worry in Ireland thai the size of unemployment benefit constituted a
deterrent to work effort. I can say without qualification that no one I met
in Denmark attached any importance to this. Friis summed up the general
view as follows: ’~We had similar controversies here in the 1950s when the
level of unemployment was high, but the controversies disappeared once
buoyant demand for labour was created. It was then clear that nearly
everyone was willing to work, and no evidence remained of significant
malingering". I was told that one can still hear stories there of people
"living it up on the dole", but such cases, even if credible, are too few to
be of any consequence. In this context, it should be noted that the Danish
unemployment benefit is much more generous than in Ireland: it amounts
to 90 per cent of income within a limit of 960 kroner a week (about £75 a
week) and lasts for a period of 2½ years.
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This evidence, if correct, raises serious questions about
¯ one of the basic foundations of the economic approach to human behaviour -
the notion that work is disutility, and leisure, utility. Even if we have
never given full credence to this idea, it still ramifies all our thinking at
the analytical level. Let us be frank, however, in admitting thst the tradi-
tional approach is largely based on apriori reasoning; that as economists
we have paid inadequate attention to the social forces influencing the choice
between work and leisure; and that there have been all too few attempts at
empirical validation. I need scarcely remind this audience of the perils
of persisting with a priori reasoning without adequate empirical verification.
However, no sensible person drops his preconceptions too
readily, and I naturally tried to probe deeper into the reasons why the
expected disincentive effects did net emerge. One factor mentioned was
the moral opprobrium of being unemployed: this becomes an influential
force when jobs are plentiful, since it is then harder for ~he inveterate
idler to excuse his position on the grounds that he cannot find a suitable
job. Furthermore, I got the impression - and it is no more than an im-
pression - that the Danish authorities were quite strict in denying unemploy-
ment behefit to a person who would not accept a reasonably suitable job
offer. Again, it is far easier for the authorities to act thus when demand
for labour is high.
Not only were the Danes not particularly concerned about
the possible disincentive effects of high tmemployment benefit, but, one of
them, Mr Kaj Westergaard, the economic advisor to the Ministry of Labour,
stated that on the contrary he would be worried by the opposite condition -
a low rate of unemployment benefit. IIis argmment was that a low rate may
engender a condition of inferiority and deprivation, leading to a culture of
~overty, so that later it might become virtually impossible to restore such
persons to normal employment.
While I encountered universal denial of the disincentive
effect of high unemployment benefit, paradoxicaDy, many of the same
people spoke with some feeling about the disincentive effect of high
1
marginal income tax rates. There was a good deal of talk about the
1. The resolution of the apparent conflict might lie in the differential
effect of social forces on decisions about work and leisure: perhaps it is
more socially acceptable to avoid, if not evade, taxes than to eschew work
altogether.
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Impact of high tax rates in forcing people to provide certain kinds of ser-
vices themselves, rather than earning extra taxable income to purchase
these services. However, no one produced any hard evidence on this
que sti on.
Nevertheless, the Danes have been seriously worried in the
past few years about the Size and growth of the public sector, and the issue
has featured prominently in their long-term perspective planning. This
worry has several interrelated bases. There is a sense in which it can
be said, subject to careful qualification, that the public sector (broadly
interpreted to include also universities, research institutes and other
bodies financed from public funds) ultimately lives off those providing
saleable goods and services. To the e.~ent that this is so, problems
could arise if the public sector grew too large in relation to manufacturing
and agriculture at the standard of living conventipnally demanded, one of
the first signs of the problem being a balance of payments deficit. This
worry would be lessened if a faster rate of growth of productivity were
achieved in industry without diminishing employment there; and that is one of
the strategies being considered. But, even with high growth of industrial
productivity, the taxation implications remain: would people be willing to
accept tax rate s sufficiently high to finance a contir, uous increase in the
share of the total labour force employed by the public sector? No answer
has been found to that question but it is a very live issue there at present,
one mmuifestation of which is the emergence of a maverick political party
whose main platform is to abolish income tax.
Another indication of concern with the problem is that
several of the public sector employees felt that their incomes would have
to rise relatively slowly in future compared with the private sector; and,
moreover, that at the higher levels of the public sector, real incomes
might even decline somewhat. These statements came from persons
likely to be directly affected, and they seemed remarkably philosophical
about the matter. They pointed out that incomes in the public sector had
risen relatively rapidly in the 1960s due to the rapid growth in public
employment, and that it was not unreasonable that they should rise more
slowly for some years hence. Also, they felt that their absolute standard
of living was so high that some reduction in real income would not be unduly
onerous.
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Wages, Prices and the Exchange Rate
This leads me to the question of wage increases in general
and their relation to internal prices and the exter~nal value of the currency.
The Danes had a higher rate of domestic inflation than most of the developed
countries during the 1960s. Since theywere then linked to the £ sterling,
this creates something of a mystery about their competitiveness, on which
I have tried to throw some light. Like everyone else, they have had an
acceleration in inflation in the past few years, but to a lesser e~ent than
in Ireland or Britain. Last year, their consumer price index rose by 15
per cent, this year they hope to hold it to abeut 12 per cent, and next year
bring it down to about 6 per cent. Why bare they been so much more suc-
cessful than us? It seems to me that there are two major factors involved:
the exchange rate and the attitlldes of trade unions.
As regards the exchange rate, the Danes, like us, were
closely linked to sterling for much of the post-war period. However, in
1967 when Britain devalued by 14 per cent, the Danes devalued by only 8
per cent. More recently, they have entered the "snake", so that they are
now linked with the mark and other currencies which have effectively
appreciated relative to sterling and the dollar. Undoubtedly, the break
with sterling and subsequent entry into the "snake" have served as a major
1
check on imported inflation. Mr Hansen, the spokesman for industry,
told me that his organisation strongly supported the discipline of the "snake"
as a brake on domestic inflation, despite the difficulties that this might pose
for competitivene s s.
However, no discipline will work if the forces involved
refuse to be disciplined. Are Danish workers any more moderate than
their irish counterparts? It is probably impossible to answer such a
question, and certainly unwise to attempt it on the basis of my inadequate
knowledge. All I can say is that Danish labour has acquiesced early this
year in a pay deal lasting for two years which is remarkably moderate.
1. The following comparison of inflation rates is instructive:
Denmark Ireland
Per cent per annum
1960-68 6.1 3.2
1968-72 5.6 8.3
1973 9.3 11.5
1974 15.3 17.0
1975 (forecast) 12 24
1976 (forecast) 6 ?
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It involves very little overall increase in mcney incomes, with the pros-
pect of a real income fall for some of the better-off workers. This,
together with the anticipated lower rate of increase in import prices, is
why they can be reasonably optimistic about getting their inflation rate
down to 6 per cent next year. The circumstances in which the pay deal
came about are rather interesting: it has been accomplished, not by a
strong government, but rather by a weak and tottering government. The
recent Danish elections were indecisive and led to a curious coalition of
the socialists with some disparate right-wing groups. I was told that the
trade unions agreed to this restrictive pay deal only because they felt it
necessary to strengthen the hand of the sccialists, whom they strongly
support. 1
Trade union attitudes apart, however, there are other
factors to be considered before we lmmch into the "snake" following
Denmark’ s cxan~ple. From what I could gather, the value of the kroner
has been maintained partly through substantial support by the German
Central Bank on foreign exchange markets; this is something that the
Dm~es do not particularly like to talk about, their antipathy to Germany
being as deeply-rooted as their love for England. More fundamental is
the fact that Denmark is not so closely bound up as ireiand in trade with
the U. K., having also major trading links with Germany, Norway m~d
Sweden, all of whom are in the "snake~’. Hence, retention of the sterling
link might have caused even greater inflationary difficulties for Denma~-k
than for Ireland. Indeed, Denmark’s devaluation in 1967, even though
less than that of sterling, was extremely unpopular among ordinary Danes,
since Norway and Sweden did not devalue at the same time. Thus, the
kroner, which had long exchanged at a stable parity with the other
Scandinavian currencies, was reduced in value° In this context, you must
realise that contacts among the Scandinavians are at least as close as
between tlie Irish and the British, with the difference that they seem to like
each other more. There are no passport restrictions, only nominal ct~s.-
toms checking for personal travel, and some of the Danes I met have holiday
homes in Sweden or Nomvay.
1. Dr Brendan Menton has drawn my attention to the fact that a reduction
in inco.me taxation early this year may also have been influential in securing
acceptance of moderation in incomes.
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Indexation
I discussed the question of tndexation in inflationary condi-
tions with Professor ~lgaard, who is very keen on it. I mentioned my
reservations about indexation which I should like to summarise briefly as
follows. In an ultimate sense, inflation may be regarded as a conflict of
interest between different groups., involving a contest about (a) maintaining
real income; and (b) changing relative positions. The hope is that indexa-
tion, by seeking to assure automatic maintenance of real income for all
without a contest, will dampen pressures in regard to (b). However, even
if it succeeds in reducing the (b)-type pressures, it still cannot work where,
as iD 1974, there is an overall loss of real income through adverse terms
of trade. Also, I would be gravely sceptical that it would, in fact, succeed
in dampening (b): if it could do so, why should a serious domestic
inflationary problem have arisen ’at all? And, in the event that the struggle
about relative shares continued, automatic indexation could only make
matters worse rather than better. The only way in which I could see any
benefit from indexation in controlling inflation would be if it applied only to
some transactions and not to all. in this way one would, in effect, be
seeldng i/o secure an implicit consensus about which gr.oups should suffer
a relative, and probably an absolute, loss fl] real income.
~}lgaard’s view was that indexation should apply only to
private, but not government, transactions so as to put relations between
the private borrower and lender, for example, on a proper footing.
Obviously, the fact that the government is not a major borrower in Denmark
would make this more feasible there than in Ireland. Here, it seemed to
me that, if index~tion applied generally in the private sector, it would be
impossible politically for the government to avoid adopting it in relation to
its own salaries, fllterest payments, and the social welfare classes. Not
only that, but the farming organisations would be likely, notwithstanding
EEC regulations, to demand something similar from the government, and
would wield strong political pressure in support of their demand. Hence,
whatever may be possible in Denmark, I remain sceptical of indexation
proposals for Ireland.
i"
Research Approaches
A great part of my time was devoted to discussions on
research approaches, exchange of staff, and other technical matters of
that nature. These discussions were valuable to me and raised some
’    20.
issues that I might mention here. One point made to me forcefully by
Friis and others was that if we in this Institute wish to influence policy,
we will have to comply with two major requirements. The first is to
write in a way that will be comprehensible, not necessarily to the man in
the street, but at least to a politician, administrator, journalist, etc, with
a special interest in the area but lacldng sophisticated academic lmowledge
1
of the subject. The second requirement, which is both more important
and less obvious, is that we must try to indicate not merely what should be
done but how it ~houId be done. For example, if one:s analysis of inflation
leads one to the conclusion that the best means of control would be through
incomes policy, it is quite insufficient for the research worker to leave
the matter at that: he should go on to indicate what form m~ incomes policy
should ~ake and how it might be put into effect. This is not to say that he
would be expected to work the matter out to the last detail, for that is the
function of goveYnment, administration, and the parties involved. But,
in Order to stimulate action by these agencies, the research worker should
examine the forces opposed to his proposal and, in the light of this study,
try to suggest in broad outline the means of circumventing or overcoming
them.
v
Another concrete example may elucidate this point further.
In discussing with Friis the ESRI study of local government finance by
Cope!and and Walsh, I mentioned the manifest inequity of the existing
rateable valuations, arising from the fact that properties have been valued
at widely different dates° While numerous bodies, commissions of inquiry,
and research reports over the last half-century have recommended a general
revision of property valuations, nothing has happened. In response to
Friis’s inquiry into the reasons for this inaction, I replied th~.t it was
partly due to bureaucratic inertia, but more fundamentally because property
owners adversely affected could exert sufficient political pressure to oppose
any synchronisation of valuations. Friis suggested that, if this were so,
there was no possibility of attaining the ideal and that the researcher,
while insisting on the ideal, should also seek to offer a worlmble compro-
mise. He instanced the arrangement devised in Denmark reg~rd.i~g the
i. While clarity is welcome whatever the audience, I myself would qualify
the above advice by adding that the style of communication depends on the
nature of the problem. In some cases, before policy can be influenced,
it is necessary to convince one’s fellow social scientists, and this process
may require a form of communication not readily intelligible to the politician,
ete.
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up-dating of rents on properties formerly subject to rent restriction: the
rent is revised notionally every couple of years without imposing the in-
creases on the existing tenant. However, for a new tenant the notional
figure becomes the actual rent. This arrangement at least puts a time
limit on the degree of inefficiency involved, and safeguards the future
without imposing too severe a burden in the present.
Though Ireland a/d Denmark are both small nations,
research on their problems is likely to raise as many issues of profound
intellectual interest as in a major country. It is probably not accidental
that the first published version of the balanced budget multiplier theorem
came frcm a Dane, Professor Gelting, as long ago as 1942, though it is
only~in a recent issue of the History of Political Economy that this has
been duly recooo-nised and the full text of Gelting’s paper published in
English for the first time. It is also no accident that much of the
interesting work on tb.e terms of trade effec~ has been done in Ireland (by
Geary) ~]din Denmark (by Bjerke), in both of which the high trade ratios
make this effect particularly import;ant. Local phenomena can obviously
provide a stimulus to ~he generation of interesting new theoretical ideas.
I was gratified to hear from a person closely associated
with the selection of EEC economists that the Irish applicants were by far
the best; and that this superiority was only partly accounted for by ~he
fact that, because of the high level of incomes in Denmark, fewer of their
economists found it attractive to apply for Brussels.
Povert~ LiDe Studies
While in Denmark, I sought advice about a research proposal
which recently reached me from the Department of Social Welfare, namely
the development of a measure of p~inimum family income° In the past few
years, the Department’s primary concern was to raise the level of social
benefits. Having achieved significant increases, they were now anxious
to judge whether, in some sense, the different classes of allowances were
adequate, or possibly even excessive in some cases. Their concept of" a
"minimum family income" is closely related to that of the .!]poverty line",
about which our Working Group on Poverty Research Priorities had ex- .
pressed considerable scepticism.
No one in Denmarkgave me any encouragement to develop
measures of minimum family income l}er se. In fact, they were strongly
opposed to this approach. They stressed that any such measures would
be highly arbitrary. While it was the "dream of every politician and
administrator" to have such awkward problems subjected to so-called
scientific prescription, neither the politician nor the administrator would
be very happy with the outcome. The decision-making process would
suffer from a compression of the diversity of experience in m~y one cJass
(such as old age pex~sioners) into a single measure. There would be
strong pressure to bring all benefits up to the mininlum, which they con-
sidered objectionable on two grounds. First, it would operate unfaii~ly:
for some, already adequately provided fur by relatives, the amount could
be two high, given the limitations on ~ate resources; while for others it
might be far too little. Second and more hmdamental it would be a nega-
tion of democracy: in a matter where subject~.~e judgment would predomi-
nate over scientific content, a non-representative body such as the ES~RI
would be exercising undue influence in specifying the minimum income
required by a family.
This is not at all to say that they felt we can do no~hing to
he!p the politician or the administrator in formulating policy on such
matters. The approach they favoured was more broadly-based study of
the lii’e style in each class (such as old age pensioners, m~employed,
deserted wives, and so on). Such studies would be concerned generally
with how such persons manage: what sources of income they have, whether
they have accumulated past savings, whether they have dependants or, in
turn, can depend on their family, how they spend their money, at what
prices they purchase, told so on. The approach could be either from an
economic or asociai viewpoint; but Friis would strongly deprecate this
introduction of disciplinary terminology, while fully recognish]g that per-
sons trained in different disciplines would not normally consider exactly
the same complex of issues. Such studies would draw attention to the
wider rmlge of policies, over and above income supports, needed to cope
adequately with the problems of deprivation; moreover, they would be of
great value to voluntary bodies.
Danish Statistics
My visit to the Danish Central Statistics Office served to
underline how handicapped We are in survey research here by the confiden-
tiality restrictions imposed on our Central Statistics Office, and the resulting
cost, in terms both of research time and survey expenses, that falls on
our Institute. In Denmark, unlike Ireland, not only do research workers
have access to the CSO data for sampling frames, but also, subject to
certain safeguards, to individual (but unnamed) biographies contahling a
considerable amount of personal information, including income tax.
b~rprisingly, in a country so recently invaded by Germany, there has been
no public discussion, let alone outcry, on this subject. This may be
because the population is so homogeneous, contains so few Jews, and
information on religious affiliation is not recorded. However, these
factors probably a ~I "p[~ :1 also in Sweden, which, nevertheless, has had con-
siderable public controversy in the matter, resulting in tight legal and
administrative restrictions on the use of the data.
The Danes intend to dispense in future with the Census of
Population, since this costly exercise is now redundant, given their other
sources of information. While admitting that their migration data are far
from perfect, they.do not consider this a serious worry in their situation:
though there is unrestricted movement behveen the Scandinavian countries,
emigration is not significant, while immigrants must register.
,.
,Ma rriag_e Patterns
The Danish CSO has had problems with some demographic
statistics because of changes in the society itself. Co-habitation is exten-
sive among young people with the statistical result that approximately 15
per cent of marriages have been "lost". The Dands are far from being a
prurient people: on the contrary, they are extremely family-centred.
Paradoxical though it may appear, they do not consider co-habitation as a
breach of this family-centred tradition. They fee! that, though no marriage
contract exists, most of these liaisons will prove as stable as marriages;
however, it is too early yet to be sure. What surprised me most was not
the existence of the phenomenon but the attitude of the older people. None
of the parents with whom I discussed the matter admitted any concern, even
should their own children be involved. And, just as an Irish parent takes
a special interest in a prospective son-in-law or daughter-in-law, Danish
parents like to inspect the prospective "co-habitee", they hope that he is a
nice boy or that she is a nice girl, and they are anxious that the relationship
be a permanent, stable, and happy one.
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In practice, quite a number of these relationships have led
to legal marriage, especially where a childwas conceived. Interestingly
enough - and this is a further indication of the radical differences in
attitudes there - the pressure for marriage in such cases is not to protect
the good name of the mother or the welfare of the child, but rather for the
defence of the father’s rights: the mother suffers no social stigma and,
trader the welfare state, would normally be financially secure whether the
relationship continued or not; the child suffers no social stigma either,
and has as much rights (in relation to such matters as irflleritance) as a
legitimate child; however, the father, in the absence of a marriage con-
trac~, would be devoid of legal rights in reJation to his own child.
Concluding Reflections
In visiting another country, one iz subject to many en’J.c.tive
stimuli, so that there is a danger of adopting one of two extreme posi~ions
in assessing the relevance of their experience to one’s own country: at one
extreme, unbounded admiration and untlfinMng emulation; or, at the other
extreme, hostility told outright rejection. Either reaction would be wrong,
the former risldng a rnisuse, and the latter a negmct, of relevant e~@erience.
Thus, while admitting rny respect for Denmark’s achievements, and my
affection fol. its people aad way of life, I have no wish to encourage a
Danish cult in Ireland. Rather, I would suggest reflection on Danish
ex2?erience to consider what can profitably be applied to Ireland, with due
regard to the different conditions aud ethos in this country.
Having already set out many issues of detail for such con-
sideration, I shall confine my concluding remarks to some larger issues.
Throughout my visit; I was repeatedly struck by the fact that a small
country like De1~mark is likely to yield more relevant insights for Ireland
than a large country. Similarity of scale introduces considerable similarity
in the nature m~d scope of problems encountered. In Ireland, we have long
tended to adopt U.I(o models - often slavishly so. It is hoped ths.t entry to
the EEC will encourage greater attention to e~_~erience in the smaller
economies of the Community, sx, d in Europe generally; and, moreover,
that this wider search for ideas will extend not only to government depart-
ments, but also to many other institutions of Irish life, such as trade
unions, educational bodies, eteo
bA review of Irela~d’s economic development incentives
might profit f~om study of Denmark’s experience - especially in regard to
whether a capital-hltensive or a labour-intensive strategy should be fol-
lowed. The capital-intensive approach can generate high labour produc-
tivity and high income levels for those employed: however, the major
doubt about such a strategy for Ireland is whether sufficient capital cm] be
mobilised to assure employment for ~he very high natural increase in the
labour force expected in the next decade. It is this doubt which has led
some of ~s to suggesfthat a more labour intensive approach might have a
better chance of securing f~111 employment, although at a lower level of
income than the alternative approach.l What is of pa[:ticular interest
about Denmark is that it has evolved a sfrategy, leading to both full employ-
ment and high incomes, which can be designated neither as capital intensive
or labour intensive. Denmark chose to invest its resources relatively
more in people than in physical assets, and to concentrate its production
relatively heavi].y in high quality goods rather thm] in high physical produc-
tivity activities. Perhaps such a skill-intensive approach might b~ more
central to Irish circumstances.
However, investment in people can be as economically un-
productive as investment in physical assets if it is not the "right" type of
investment. In pursuit of its strategy, Denmark has channeled massive
resources into education in the industrial arts which has ylelo.~d significant
and tangible industrial benefits, as outlined earlier in this paper. The
same forms of investment need not necessarily be ]’right" for Irelm]d. It
may be, for example, that the Danes have been active so long in the design
field, and have ,~such an ove~zhelming comparative advantage in that ares,,
that it would be foolish for Ireland to try to emulate their achievement.
Denmark, u]f[ike Ire’land, possesses not merely outstanding designers but
an informed and appreciative public to provide a home market base for
quality desig]]s. However, before dismissing this possibility the following
points should be considered:
I. These alternative strategies are never so polarised in practice.
Labour-intensity is a matter of degree, and no one is suggesting that Ireland
should seek to compete with the underdeveloped world in low wage techniques:
indeed, this would be impossible since income levels in Ire:land are many
times higher than in underdeveloped countries. What the proponents of a
labour-intensive approach are seeking is greater attention to the relative
scarcity of capital than is evident in present policy, which involves negative
interest rates, larger tax concessions for borrowers.than for savers, and
the use of capital grants as a means of attracting new industry.
(a) Ireland already produces goods where desig~ is a relevant
consideration. The report, Des ig~__in Irel-an______~d, stated that
while for some products the standard of desigm was high,
many were so badly designed that they ’%vould not have the
slightest chance of competing successiully on the world
market". Hence, if only in the interests of preserving
e.~sting jobs in free trade conditions, we caroler afford to
be unconcerned about design.
0o) Comparative advantage is not a static phenomenon, consisting
solely in a fixed endowment of natural resources and historical
antecedents. A country can create and modify comparative
advantage by appropriate measures. As the Desig~n Team
emphasised, there is no suggestion of "unqualified trans-
plantation of features from Scandinavian countries to Ireland";
on the contrary, the best designed products found by the Team
in Ireland ’bvere those based on traditional craft industries
successfully interpreting the Irish tradition".
(c) It is probable that the preferences of many young people
would accord with a policy of greater stress in education on
the industrial arts, and, if so, these preferences could
readily be harnessed to shaping f-ature comparative
advantage. Thousands of students are at present cl~leified
in academic studies for which they have limited ability, and
emerge with poor qualifications for anything othe~: than
clerical-type work, in. which there is likely to be a huge
labour surplus over the nex~t decade. My own informal
discussions with such persons indicates that many would be
far happier to be trained in areas like design and technology,
provided adequate status was accorded to such an education
and the resulting forms of emplo3;ment.
(d) The high status attached to academic education at the second
and third levels in Ireland - especially among the lower
middle-class and farming community -- stems partly from
historical economic forces, for long the only jobs readily
available to their children in Ireland were clerical work in
the civil service, banks, and state bodies (such as the ESB,
CIE, ere). The employment situation changed considerably
in the 1960s as shortages of sldlled workers began to emerge.
However, no significant change in attitudes to education
occurred, for two major reasons. First, the sanctity
attached by trade unim]s and professional associations to
maintenance of wage differentials ensures that any adjust-
ment in relative incomes, and the resulting change in stat~s
generally, is slow to emerge.l And, second, public policy,
which could have operated to accelerate the change in educa-
tional incentives and in a~itudes, instead served to reinforce
the stat~s quq.
Thus, unless Ireland can evolve a comparative advantage
based on the large numbers of academically-trained personnel which it is
at present producing, it could do worse thml concentrate more resources
i. A breach in relative incomes has tended to occur more outside the
wage structure by the entry of skilled workers into private contract service.
in education in the industrial arts on lines similar to, but not necessarily
identical with, Denmark. Apart from education and training, Denmark
has also devoted massive resources to housing, health and social benefits
which also form part of its investment in people.
It is important to bear in mind~ however, that even with a
restructuring Of publ~ic expenditure, the resources available’ for:investment
in people are far more limited than in Denmark, not only because of lower
income levels, but even more so because of the substantial difference in
dependency rates. This difference can be illustrated most simply by
"relating the population not economically active to the ~orldng population,
since there is a sense in which the former can be said to depend on the
incomes of the latter. Denmark with a population of 5 million has nearly
.2-} million workers, so that there is one dependant per worker, Irelmld
with a population of 3 million has only 1 millio1~ workers so that there are
1lwode:pendants per worker. This vast difference reinforces the need for
priozities and economy in the allocation of public resources. At present,
many tasks al~e performed by highly-trained persons which could be done
equally well with far less training (e. g. by grealer use of para-medicals
in health’and dental care)° Bu.t, even with maxbmun efficie.l]cy i.n resource
allocation, the reality remains fbat ’the investment per person must ncces-
sarily be.far lower thsn in Denmark, e-~en taldn.~ aceo~.mt of .external
borrowing. Hence, it would be unrealistic to hold out the prospect that we
could quicldy move at one and the same time towards DanJ sh livin~ standards
as well as full employment. Thus, if the latter goal is to be given priori’.ry,
the ~eed for restraint in the progression of incomes cannot be evaded.
Finally, I would draw your attention to the paradox that
struck me most forcefully: though Denmark is highly socialised in terms
of pe~’sonal welfare services, there has been far less State intervention,
and far more private initiative, at the productive level than in Ireland. I
have already given examples of this m~d perhaps I might mention another.
Several people spoke of the Danish flexibility i_n productive arrangements,
whereby, for ey~mp!e, small farmers engage part-time in industry and
part-time in farming. This is a subject of great interest to us in Ireland:
some have recommended that the government formulate a policy on the
i. Indeed, the difference in the dependency burden may be even greater
than these figures suggest since it is likely that a higher proportion of
Denmark’s dependent population is in the active age groups, thus involving
less demand for education, health care, etc.
matter, by which they usually mean that the government should offer
financial support, or even establish a new state-sponsored body to look
after the ma~ter, Theremarkable thing is that.in Denmark it has been
entirely a m~itter Of private initiative, l~eople themselves devised alter-
natives to meetlocal and family circumstances, with the result that the
arrangements exhibif:aw[de degree of~fle.~ibility and variety.
This poses the question as to whether we have moved too
far in Ireland towards coddling of the private seetol~ by the State in business
affairs, it was understandable in .the light of.on/" history~ arid particularly
in the absence of an entrepreneurial tradit~.on, that the State should in the
past have taken substantial init, iatives through state-sponsored industries
and promotion bodies, and by mesns of grsnts and subsidies. But, it is
possible to have too much of a good thing, mid it is only pzuldent to enquire,
in the changed conditions of tlhe 1970S, whether we inight not be going so
:far=as to.erode, initiative by creating..a ~ituation:w~here the.private decision-
-maker is concerned less with %he eomln.ereial vi~b.~llty of hisproject tlm~a
.:,lhe extent, of:stai:e funding.° i raise ghi:s q~eStio:,-~without ,~ ~el~ng to answer
it h e-~.e. But, i would llke to make clear that it is not a political p.]ea for
¯ a return to laissez faire: the fact of the matter is that. h~ any democratic
¯ state, whether socialist or not, it~ acone~bi¢ pe.rfor1nanee and cultural life
¯ depends a:great’dea}:on-.~e ~t~’:~tive--of ~ah~u~Is~ ~, D~ ..... -~ ~it is -~
if they had dee~c~d to make people totalty secure, at the p ersonal.Iev:el while
expecting_them to get onwith ,the:job ~’~t the: productive le~el, .Ever... if this
spirit doe,s not e~%end to .Ireland generally
,
. ’i hope thal; E S[<I staff at l~ast,
who have recently won for themselves considerable security of tenure, will
note the Danish corollaryl
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Mr S~ren PAsh~j Pedersen, Administrator, Danish National Institute of
Social Re search.
Mr ~le Hansen, Programme Director, Danish National Institute of Social
¯       Research.
Mr Irmrsten H il!estrdna, Research Associate, Danish National Institute of
Social Re search.
Mr Niels Groes, Lecturer, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
Professor Poul Milh~j, Economic Research Institute, Copenhagen School
of Economics and Business Administration.
Professor Anders ~)Igaard, Institute of Economies, University of Copenhagen.
(Professor 51gaard is a member of the Chairmanship of
the Danish Economic Council. The Council is a parallel
body to the Irish National Economic and Social Co~mcil,
and its Chairmanship consists of three independent
economists, the so-called ’q?.hree Wise Men" - see
Anders ~igaard "The Role of External Advisers: Some
Danish Experience" (November 197{, mimeographed;
w
copy in ESRI library). I talked also with several
economists on the secretaria~ of the Chairmanship.)
Mr Erling J~rgensen, Deputy Director, Danish Central Statistics Office.
Mr I(aj Westergaard, Chief Economic Advisor, Ministry of Labour.
Mr J~agen Hansen, Economist, Danish Federation of Industry.
